Courage to Act

 

Title – Courage to Act

Author – Ben Bernanke – All Rights Reserved.

Year – 2015 – Distributed by Amazon

Publisher – W. W Norton and Company Press

Review by

Sampson Onwuka

The best that can said of Ben Bernanke’s – Courage to Act – is that it provides the reason for FED Reserve intervention during  the U.S Economic crisis in 2008. The crux of argument is that the crisis was not comparable to the Great Depression, that unlike the great depression which was due to the failure of the country to act, the Great Recession of 2008 was not the case. Economic Intelligence can fail. Courage to Act is the anecdote for the practical vista of money supply exercised in theory by leading economics. Whether or not Americans are convinced that the desperate actions for instance 13(13) last invoked in 1936 - taken by Ben Bernanke (U.S Fed Chairman 2006 – 2014) and his group at the Federal Reserve and the U.S Treasuries was meeting standard for the debt-driven economic crisis leading to 2008, is secondary, secondary and partial to the deserving resolutions by decisions taken by members of U.S Government at this point.

The coin toss is between the willingness to act and appropriateness of the actions, for if the ‘courage to act’ is itself the chief item in decision marking complex, it will defeat the essence of risk evaluation. Courage to Act is Bernanke’s defense of his actions during 2008 crisis, and the actions of U.S Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which despite their liberty in handling crisis were grappling with the turn of events in the markets in 2008. Several schools of thought; MIT economic, Keynesians, New classical economics, economic school for minimum Government Intervention for Chicago, etc., take their turn in trying to master the desperate new dimension of the Banks in the United States and the impact of Federal Funds rate. 

In 1782 – 1791 U.S had constitutionally chartered several American Banks and the brunt of the Bank’s activity rested one time treasury - Alexander Hamilton. In the later decades enjoined by the compeers, U.S created the First Bank of the United States (1791 – 1811), followed by the Greenbacks in 1862 and imprimatur panic of 1837, 1857, 1873, 1893, and 1907 where William Bagehot arguments failed to stem the tide of a great unraveling. Less than a decade later (1914) U.S created the Federal Reserve that faced in early 30’s the imprecation of a Great Recovery. Bernanke observed that nearly all periods of Great banking shake-up in the United States was during economic depression and recession. And these changes in Banking are still visible in the United States. We are led to perceive that certain changes were concomitant with depression and recession as if these changes depended on disaster, as if the country could have performed without these disasters. Whether or not this is the case, the 2008 crisis was not going to be different.  

It was perhaps wonderful to witness how feverish the financial world collapsed into the atrium of Mariner Eccles Building with many actors of money markets and financial cabals; Mervin King (England), Magacki Shirakawa (Japan), Jean Claude Trichet (ECB), Mario Draghi (Italy) set to take actions and that their actions were to have a lasting impact on banking and finance and they were sure of it. The author is reminded of such circumstances by allusions to his grandparents detached from Austro-Hungary and Lithunia uncertain about their new found homes in the United States. 

The new U.S president Barack Obama needed an answer, perhaps a solution to the economic arising from 2008, and the idea was not hard to find. The banks were to be held responsible for certain behaviors and this include some big dependable bank. There was something lacking with many of the banks including Bear Stearns and Lehman Brother who led much of the market in debt recovery and something was wrong with the financial structure of AIG which on the surface did not show any signs of collapse. AIG needed money and is the apple of every body’s eyes, so also Lehman and many other investment banks. Some of the investment brokerage would be let go and to a large extent, the toss was between AIG and Lehman rested on the seismic impact in the Global Macro. It mattered that some actions must be taken, that such actions may or may not seem popular and accepted by all, but a change was necessary and hence the changes at the Banks – some of whom were doomed to fail - were a second matter in 2008. Bernanke had to introduce a way of knowing the real strength of these banks and this led to the introduction of financial stress test for U.S banks.

Short View

There are several things which a book of this nature lack, an author can speak of his or her own influences and governing psychology. For Ben Bernanke this was not clearly the case and whether or not his reach with ‘Helicopter Ben’ prompt an indirect comparative and influence from Benjamin Strong, his influence was not clear in the whole evolution of the courage to Act, but the script inundated his activity in office and it was easy from beginning to see that Bernanke was an inflation hawk. Some may say Stanley Fischer that go back to the 1983 NBER, but from the cursory glance at the later 200 of the last and receding 600 pagination, there is a presence of Jamie Dimon and Lloyd Blankfein.

We look at the term failure to Act is a beseeching entropy for understanding the problems of Banks on a national level, that the it seems after reading a portion of the Bernanke’s Courage to ACT, that there was something lacking in the attitude of the Government and at the Feds. What was it? Perhaps the problem was not the courage to act but the excuse to act – or the audacity to act from the perceived notion that banking industries needed reform. We can read from Bernanke’s ‘Courage to Act’ that a ‘failure to act’ is a product of ‘leisure class’ re-adaptation of Adam Smith economics lazes- faire or do nothing classic approach during periods of great upside. It was in terms of national crisis, the best approach to perceived and periodic recession. 

Perhaps this is not always the case, this is not the case when there are questions of credit options, credit squeeze, details of credit auctions, hosting the changes houses which we confront every day that predate changes at the world of Banks driven by public media frenzy fawning the psychology of money. We cannot fail to presume from the ‘Courage to Act’ a question of exact period of time when Federal Reserve had to intervene and for how long. 

There are so many things the author and the Courage to Act didn’t talk about; the problem of market collisions or what happens when markets collide, the poverty of Taylor rule application – at least in the last receding 20 years at the Federal Reserve and under the chairmanship of Bernanke, how U.S Banks got exposed easily oversea, the issue of re-investment Act and U.S financial literacy. Bernanke did not discuss conversion rate, the rate of a city return rate to federal or national rate, the crass of internal economies of scale and interstates lending, the possible solution to housing given its causation for the crisis, the issue of shadow banking that rock much of our U.S investment banks, the future of the Federal Reserve, shift and duration associated with bond markets and precious metals – in contest of recent adverse with crude oil at least on the plainest possible example, the U.S financial oligarchy in context of unemployment, etc., which he so well handled.

Madleine O Hosli ‘Euro’

By

Sampson Onwuka

Madleine O Hosli in the book titled ‘Euro’ raised the issue of price stability and EMU, in respect to the currency that the “…provisions of EMU suggest that the predominant goal of the ECB is to maintain price stability with some factors rendering this task difficult in practice – but possibly at the expanse of some global exchange rate stability”, that for instance, Euro may rival Dollars, sprawling a world of competition that may affect the total market and financial stability of the world. The author goes on to argue that “If monetary policy were to be dominated by political interests, however, and political rationales were to determine the external value of the euro, for example, European monetary integration would constitute a threat to outsiders.” Why this point looks solid on paper, it looks very bad in practice, for sure and in reality, the issue of threat to outsiders in terms of investment can only be possible if and when the price of Euro become expensive. That may also refer to the issue of real estate since in reality the strength of the Euro, may even welcome the exportation of dollars or sovereign wealth to ECB via Arab oils and dollars. The author of the book however made the point about trans-border trade that clear that ‘The European experience, as Barry Eichengreen contends, supports those suggesting that stable and extensive trade relationship are important prerequisites for a smooth functionary of the International Monetary system”

The fundamental difference between US banks and those of Euro is that US Banks are not allowed to engage in any form of securities lending, which is notionally the act of removing ‘debt from a company’s balance sheet’. Euro Banks are allowed to engage in both forms of lending and in all forms of securities, irrespective of the Insurance product. Until Glass-Seagull Act of 1933, US Banks were allowed to participate in all forms Securities lending, to such disputable degree that the stock market failed, the banks failed as well. And secondly, these Banks and their owners were prone to manipulating the stock market and inventing their own Rating and setting their own prices, a problem that somehow manages to make reappear in various forms. As such the houses and other components of the real estate rose and decline as the Banks saw fit, and when the political forces appeared, Banks will to being held responsible for leading or misleading the generality of the Public. These Banks pretty much operated like the European counterparts, but the rules set for SEC following the depression made impossible for them to act like their European counterparts. Thirdly, whatever happens in Europe somehow manages to affect US, in spite of the best that can be said is that Glass-Seagull Act may have inadvertently worked for the benefit of American market, which if Europe is willing to adopt it may also help Europe.

William emphasized the role of Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) which should stay very clearly away from the power banks that occupy the ranks of the general rating agency and investment institutions. In essence, the presence of TARP without adequate follow-up on their part will lead, may lead to ‘Too Big to Fail’. The incident of AFX as an accounting failure became that much of back drop, it should have meant that the operation board were not aware of what was available the time of incident. The problem may however require the general participation of the Banking world, where institutions that make our life possible “Canada has embraced a Universal Banking model with its top five banks representing approximately 90% of its banking model with its top five banks representing. Approximately 90% of its Banking business, and yet these institutions never pose a “too big to fail’ threat”. William mentioned that “Unlike the United States, Canada has only one regulatory body, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI). This prevents agencies from sending mixed signals and Banks from the playing the regulatory arbitrage game, seeking the most lenient overseer. The OSFI sets Capital constraints more stringent than Basel II guidelines, and banks are required to set Interval Capital target.”

As some experts once mentioned that we take it that “…the future of the idea of Europe! If it has one, depends less on central banking and agricultural subsidies, on investment in technology or common tariffs, subsidies, on investment in technology or common tariffs, than we are instructed to believe.”

We take it that Idea of Europe – the subject of George Steiner’s Essay (2004; 2012) is on Europe as upon a fair, for here as perhaps elsewhere Europe for Steiner “…is the place where Goethe’s garden almost borders on Buchen wald, where the house of Corneille abuts on the marketplace in which Joan of Arc was hideously done to death.” In the drama that follow parts of James Joyce and his Ulysses, the author is no longer at ease with the art, his reflection is a character from perhaps an influence no longer affair for Ireland. It is not here that imaginations fail to impress than character is subject upon a ‘blue guitar’ as if Europe with ‘all its fears’ is consigned to the deep of history. The rise of Europe and its civilization began with Christianity, it staggered along the corridors of Judaism, Islam and the Gypsies, with the collapse of Christianity and others, it yields to its decline. It is the negative that is the picture.

We invoke here the character of Rob Riemen and his interpretation of Steiner’s Essay that false is going forth when an idea is not upon an act. There is something of uncertainty is an act, original on how it evolves and like a play, it leads somewhere, perhaps not a play it is riddled with uncertainty. It is the resonance of an act endears as a play, for a play is upon an act, hold differently alters as well.

Where George Steiner could not have imagined his essay upon a Joyce Country, his shift of apathy and invocations on Spinoza; ‘All things excellent are as difficult as difficult as they are rare”, swallow his commandment that you ‘do not shy away from that which is difficult’. A green guitar for Europe upon a blue outfit may or may not impress, but there is an understatement that a gap exist between what defines the difference between polar ends and actions which a natural reactions authors for a moment. In all reality, there are limits of expectations in history and for a moment, an act in the moment defines history, history defines an idea, and idea defines certain aspect of character.

Rob Riemen thus says, “Europe committed suicide by killing its Jews. The destruction of six million European Jews, the destruction of six million European Jews, the destruction of the world of Mahler, Alban Berg, Hofmannsthal, Booch, Kafka, Celan, Karl Kraus, Walter Benjamin .… was also the destruction of l’esprit europeen, the idea of Europe. With the loss of this idea, nothing remained of Europe but a cultureless, soulless, purely geographic and economic entity,” The future is not the concern of this commentator, he seeks redemption for an idea of Europe, he is a product of some past, short in the grasp of the changing landscape that perhaps elsewhere like some old Irish Country, landscapes betray, etc., and history is upon a time. He is searching for some epiphany perhaps, no more than character as with idea Europe ‘setting forth’ is epiphany not from rear view and images.      

After the Music Stopped - Alan S. Blinder

Title - After the Music Stopped
Author - Alan S. Blinder

Published by - Penguin

Year - 2013
Review - Sampson Onwuka

'The financial crisis, the response, and the work ahead….'

The theme motivation for financial crisis at the very junior level is perhaps the summary of the book by Alan Blinder. The best-selling author presented a step by step unraveling of the problems of 2008 and why it happened. It is important that a case study of this nature should incorporate some of the basic innovation in earlier books on 2008. It is important that the territorial integrity of the author is defended concerning the left and right of the crisis, beginning with a short dribble into the failing necessity to reprove the lending practice. Whereas the author may have given to several informed sources on the lingering problems of debt service and repay rate, we wonder why no few Americans mentioned Alan Blinder to the corridors of the prophets of financial unbound. At least some of us indicated that such was the case anymore than the situation warranted, but the sharp thrust between a misnomer and organ of the Reserve is within the dust on the investigative reporting. At least in crisis - there are always causes and effects, especially the reasons for the crisis, but in his book, there are several trying reasons for the period and why the lessons serve several purpose and one. 

For a professor attached to Princeton University and a doctored advertorial for financial capacity - especially in Risk management, there are possibilities of assuming a just leniency to his lithe academic. Nothing is far from the gospel and so the professor may sounded that the lessons were not obvious or the consequences better than expected. The lessons which the book offers survive for ordinary reasons, to a point that we appreciate his book only from a distance with lit glow light of thoroughly searching example - yet lacking in originality. 

It is interesting that the author – Alan Blinder - a one time member of Federal Reserve and accomplished duct tape for reforms at the Federal Reserve may point out some of the benefits of writing about the latest crisis years after the incident, he's point is that edited materials of that structure may not or not likely persuade public dissent. The title 'After the Music Stopped' is far more stile than macarana that follows a different title such as the 'Music Ended'. There are mirage resulting from doctrine linear perception of some of trying moments of the Federal Reserve and why certain actions were a moral constipation that needed the experiment, but then reality checkers in. There are issues of Prime Mortgages (a) FHA/VA mortgages and Residential mortgage-backed securities ($1.2 trillion in 2006), and the additional weight of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprises Oversight (OFHEO) which the author raised, and this is the case, the resolve is generally infectious. It may therefore serve is no small purpose and perhaps not enough reasons to propose that the author was writing with a mirror reflecting the prejudiced concern of the public concerning $1.2 trillion and why, but it renders itself disabled by the enigma that welcomes the risk when the going is good and when the 'music is moving'. For if we suggest to the rest of us that a 22% increase in house acquired over a period, is worth the trial by market, we may or may not resist the greater temptation of doubting the munificence of buying, selling, and carrying on the deal. 

The author argues that the human factors may have a played a hand, but the fingers were not savior grace when it was too obvious that against the decoration of a house build of derivative, it was destined to die a sudden and perhaps uncertain death. Decay and Death enlarge our views from 2008, and in this book that a pomposity erodes reason that there houses were too fly to remain unchecked.    

There are Deals with General Motor and Chrysler and TARP for multi-billion dollar bridge (1) National Economic Council - (NEC) (2) Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), “The markets involved included those for mortgage backed securities (MBS), other asset-backed securities (abs), commercial paper (CP), repurchase agreements (“repos”), and a bewildering variety of derivatives, including the notorious collateral debt obligations (CDOS) and the ill-fated credit default Swaps (CDS).” This tautological behavior is useful as a way of improving the public psychology and as a way of improving the expectation at the market place. classroom and the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), Systemic Risk Regulator – Ted, the SEC, The FDIC, in terms of the financial landscape, Federal Reserve Reform – Section 13 (13) “finance bailouts”, ‘Glass-steagall barriers….’, securitization of money, Capital and liquidity Requirement,  (SIFI) (SIFI), (TBIF), reforming the rating agencies, proprietary trading by banks and re-arranging the regulatory con, derivatives, regulating Hedge funds, pay package for executives, redesigning mortgage finance ….

How well we recall the themes of the Music are details for an end game - that is how the expectations of irrationality in market movement and how the behaviors in common momentum inspire caution. There is the Golden rule ‘do unto others as you want them to do unto you’ – a nun to a more familiar ‘stitch in time’ each line capable of forestalling the false sensation of moving market and poverty if not failure for not trying. There are winners and losers when markets expose the earning potential, there are risk in many ways than one, but one recurrent theme which the lasting principles of even a Federal Reserve cannot defend is the premier issue of long term investment or housing even banks saturate borrowing and lending practice. There are times that we may wish certain times hardly take place in business of everyday life, or avoid narrow disclosure indictment for a failed or failing house such as Countrywide but when as from Irrational behavior of any market we learn of profit, there are hardly any way out of the saddle back. 

Alan blinder in this tailored explicating of the forcing pre-eminent in 2008 assume to disorder that this was not the case in the last kamikaze for U.S market. The toss between the end of a sensitive investment group and the collapse of even greater proportion were not items that escape the decision complex of 2008 class, and even in this book, there are lessons that hardly heralded worldwide financial shortfalls.

Alan Blinder – no stranger to reform and perhaps no leader of any reform begins with his thesis on housing that “…home-building rose from 4.5 percent in 2000 to just over 6 percent in 2005. That extra 1.5 percentage points of GDP, spread out over five years, added just 0.3 percent per year to the overall GDP growth rate. Not much.” Compared to the housing numbers that were sentenced to a presumption of 30 year decay or mortgage at a requisite 6% and in the receding decade and perverse five years, the houses were returning to the market with 17%– 22% rate which has a net compounding effect of proportion which the new owners were not aware of. He posed the question of subprime and the issue of indicators – from the expectations ‘you couldn’t lose by investing in houses’, that the temptation to take additional debt during the long decade is exponential in its unraveling that a price tag twice the original currency was too common for any buyer to see the imprecator. For instance, at the growth rate of 1.5 percentage and 0.3 diffusion rate – not necessarily bankrupt from economic progress is too tar for a selling width than the buying range for a 22% overnight increase in market value.

Alan Blinder once more, that (p.19), “When an economy is inching along, with employment drifting down, spending weakening, and its financial system reeling from gut wrenching year of ups and downs, that economy is in a weak position to withstand any adverse shocks.” Blinder did not mention spending section away from CPI since investment over the top is a kind of spending from only salvaged by the recovery rate from 0 convexity and nearly a debt and investment category when there is an uptake. Blinder indicated that US economy under the fine numbers of jobs and employment numbers showed only relative concerns of slowing down until on September 15th 2008 when Lehman filed to Bankruptcy and in his words ‘the whole US economy fell of the table.” However we can use a counter-argument for Job and GDP dependent economy that GDP is so far as the overall US markets are concerned was a better measure, for instance, Job losses in 2008 averaged ‘152 thousand’ per month, but towards the end of 2008, the losses leaped to 598, 000 jobs per month and then to 780 thousand job losses in the first few months of 2009. These numbers are negligible if only we can show that the US market and economy was adding enough money and enough jobs throughout the same period of the down turns.

The Short View 

The changing face of the transition is between 17% and 22% fixed income securities makes a louder case, that one the investing market divide their own according to how well and perhaps easily to rain in the buyers. That is the material culture of investment banks – or so they become after 2008 – is such that the corporation feigned under the microscope of risk asset allocation, overstated some of the debt on houses to earnings – even on a national level, and ended packaging or re-packaging several loans for customers creating money from non-monetary bath. Simply put the familiar issue of collateral debt obligation or collateral in shorts, was such that these spring boards for many companies and individuals served equal opportunity for other debt sanctuary elsewhere – with or without the suspicions of the Commercial banks. We take that a 40 to 1 leverage at (2.5%) is base story for a financial pyramid that has a 40 to nearly 1 chance of making it, almost pyramid obverse down. This is not the same with 2.5% going rate or any hurdles over 2% - there are chances that the rate at which buildings stand and the structure in of itself may give us hints of understanding.  We may add that the actions taken by Feds and Treasury was no contingent on CDO or OTC or collateral requirement for banks with FDIC and Federal Reserve convertibles. 

There are issues that are forcing the actions of the lending party through a credit based avenue that never since the age of credit card and at least the run of the 80’s that made its way into American industrial life. If there is CDOs and (CDO) 2, they result from placing CDOs on top CDOs and may lead to CDO2 which where the problems of the collateral begins and perhaps ends. 8% losses that accumulates “across all five underlying mortgage pools – D2 – securities promised to pay debts if Bank Corporation (RBC)

In so far as Paul A. Volcker is concerned, these correlations where not directly effective, he took more faith in larger picture, increased interest rate mainly as the overall economy detected new growth and mainly in employment numbers suggest. That poor correlation enhanced public expectations in the markets, for we were sure that that huge percentage appreciation of interest rate promoted a frisson effect that short term outlooks of many businesses were compromised with such gallop changes interest rate only to be pampered and perm-pressed or smothered into long range planning giving the plateau that was reached in the 80’s characterized in part by lack of leads, stagflation; arbitrary justifying price and problem of demand by default creating redundancies which are natural consequences of a fully cornered stock market or extreme cases of zero or lack of international interest scalable. So Dovish job numbers is a persuasion for the future hence more lenient to long term US or Bond markets, than the present value estimators of interest rate and the Hawks who like Bernanke showed obvious emphasis on the Big Banks, the here and now estimate for future gain.

The seven distinction raised and discussed by the author as areas of interest (1) inflated asset prices (2) excess leverage (3) lax financial regulation (4) disgraceful banking practices (5) the crazy quilt of bad regulation (6) the abysmal performance of the statistical rating agencies (7) a problem of permanent money. His general and main concern is (1) subprime mortgage (2) Alt – A mortgage ---origination of loans. 

It does not support inflationary pressure or tendencies towards expectations which govern Europe bonds with collateral emphasis on new Jobs and employment numbers which is sometime different from unemployment and jobless rate. It measures the impact of labor and employment statistics on the development of U.S interest rate and where the interest rate as we mentioned can serve as a direct sensitive US economic barometer, it is what affects US interest rate especially during 8% seasonal adjustment such as Christmas when demands tend to last, that a change or to some extent failure to meet estimate or dividends which are bound to interest rate reflect activities from the top affecting the bottom, unusual changes with momentum and aggregate demand that from prices further appreciation of interest rate, the real interest rate being those within the margins of the Fund’s rate.

Basel III in context ontext of U.S local Community

By

 Sampson I. Onwuka

Europe in terms of the International world markets and International banking Standards such as Basel III, are so well trimmed that the even minor economic growth within the West of Europe is not essentially open to new comers let alone others from different ends of the earth. Basel III accord is about several interest points of financial accords, one of which is the theme of lending with 0% expectation in the nearest future, with a minimum requirement of $250 billion by popular sources, with under-listed banks able to periodically demonstrate their ability to withstand a stress test and overcome the poor problems of compensation. Whereas Basel I and II defined European attitude to the American industries, Basel III defines American reaction to questions of over-exposure, especially under the limelight on the last financial crisis in 2008. If Europe is preparing for new financial millennium by attracting funds for its poorly maintained engineering structures, there are thin lines between separating actions Banks based in Europe and the United States, and the actions by their state and the sovereign nations. There is only area of interest where these two set of information arrears appear to co-inside which is in International Bank and financial institutions for economic policies. One of these is the Basel Accords which influence the decision making process of IMF Banks and banks associated with World Banks. The other issues associated with these influences are the structure of the international health organization which differs in function from world health organization. The first function mainly as financial institution for financial profit – for instance Banks for profit or private (specie) banks and world based organization are sponsored – policy mediated organizations aimed to interfere and discourage wholesale outbreak of new epidemic. In terms of world history and banks, certain global behaviors has determined its life-span, in wars and bonds markets, in trade usually following the dictator economy, a role of regional bank for  instance West African  Bank for England - play a useful role in narrating the fiscal responsibilities of the actuary; insurance fidelity, transnational business empire such as Royal Dutch, East English Company, and the functions of the paying Government.  World Banks insist of lending at a lower rate – at some point to poverty driven low economic expectation communities – a quest that is not different from Europe central IMF banks, saving that IMF is a consortia of private banks with as much demands for goodwill interest as investment for profit. All banks are in the business to profit – including World Bank – and the question of Universal Bank is the extent that external factors – primarily financial rating by others can form the basis of the actions by the State or the federal government or by individuals pursuant to wealth. The role of these banks in helping transform the never ending wishes of the private and the government, and how well or easily this happens proclaims the wealth of information and resources available. Where financial institutions and trade centers or trade fairs around the world, rely on Sovereign wealth and policy, the reasons behind Basel III agreement is the command of attention that the banks engaged in international communities bring to a society such as the United States and Brazil. We can encourage nations of the world to engage with sponsorship, charity, cheap loans to standing international banks and foundations, the actions of the Banks with heavily weighted indexing for investment and risk management must include their plans for penetrating all communities including in this case – African American Communities in U.S and Brazil.

Here’s the conundrum, the poverty rate in Eastern Europe alone is quite comparable to what is available in many third world markets. It is possible to suggest that there are economic reasons why Europe has to censure the attention is getting from Asia, for if these Tariffs and organizations lower the standards as required by world markets, Europe may suffer additional shedding of the Economic maturity preeminent in 2014. Such process limits Europe as a truly International Open markets, and like Asia – who deliberately manipulate their economy and operate all shades of Shadow Banking (Moon-Walking) reverts to U.S and to some degree the British who are not free from the trims of international currency manipulation. Of course the debate over the issues of cultural and national responsibilities, permanent secretary to United Nations, permanent membership of World Health Organizations created the nerve that a society bereft of reasons and authority cannot necessarily tolerate interference of the United Nations or World Organizations aimed at combating epidemic or similar demanding problems of humanity including in recent cases – tyrannical behaviors and arms dealing. The arguments didn’t survive the examples of WWI and WWII, the problems of the League of Nations and Germany affirmative attitude to restitution. The restitution proved too much for any one state and prepared the false reasons for exerting the ‘living space’. There are questions of Spanish Flu at the turn of the last century and the papered required for International Organization working handling the many deaths against the protective rights of individual nations, but the strange case of Polio and adverse cases of cold viruses in many parts of world proved a strange reason to organize a world health approach. The examples are not financial and the article does not seem to raise the sustained consequences of WWII and European Colonization of several parts of Africa, but it throws the dart on the possibilities of handling certain levels of financial liability and poverty in many parts of the world. This is where Basel plays a gifted role in arranging to shift the attention of certain international banks to questions of international policies, respecting the vital nerves of the provincial states and their security concerns.

There are changes in the last few years that has taken place in world markets and yes, Americans have gotten richer not poorer but so also the world. Whereas the question of the International Human rights and justice is loosely held in world markets, we can argue that the struggle with shifting attention of free markets from one form to another embraces the larger question of economic advantage and meaning. We need more markets attracting business in all classes of respect, more economic societies looking to sponsor vital nerves of business which includes the middle class and we need to pursue the World Market requirement for lands and seas, for transnational corporations to the banks which do not necessarily secure the magic for economic health without a running currency. If for instance U.S dollars are hanging there to help the world, it does so out of neutrality or freeze in the policy of expansion which does not necessarily mean policy of contraction. Several markets that define itself in many ways than one, in Europe, in Asia, and in Africa, can gradually broach the gap. It does not seem to the rest of us, that development banks can function without sovereign attachment. It does seem that the international banks in competitive advantage can choose to relocate their responsibility and expectation in tier 3 economic communities to expectations that require long term strategy without losing the primacy of the investment strategy. These are the areas that IMF and World Banks can decide the fate of many countries, especially those that shift from nationally owned corporations to privatization schemes requiring the heavy weight lifting by Banks. Basel II and its accord does not discourage the debt gap that IMF and World Banks end up with these countries, it disclaims it. Whereas Basel I boomed around the policies of regional franchise and crude oil companies (sisters) and their OPEC, Basel III may require us to look the penetration of their auction banks in their private communities and in the International markets. Whereas International Banks and Sovereign Wealth govern parts of the mislabeled regional currency floatation, it does not direct the transfer of investment banks to OCD banks, or counter the bank to bank requirement for over-night lending when there are cases of late return of rate as we witnessed in 2008. If the end of Basel II consists of the damage to the system that can occur over-periods of long term strategy and failures of sovereign banks to state the position of several banks that are too big to fail, the lessons of a misapplied fund rates and diffusion largely based on rate over money storage conceive of a necessity for stress test, and the reaction by the lenders to questions of repay rate. Although the solution by U.S is big banks operate at low percentage, and universal Bank is the school officially open in U.S, the shrinking roles of IMF to ECB establishes a core for Basel Accord requirement for Banks and international exposure.

We compare Canada to U.S, it has limits of its bearing vintage, at least, Canada is toeing a similar line of business practice from United States, but it is a smaller market benefiting the larger franchise of World Market than India many times the size. But in the age increasingly defined by productive aspiration it is perhaps better rehearsed from the shocking lack of consumption economies which are the problems in 2014. It may be equally difficult to escape the limits of Chinese success given the first fact that 80’s could in of itself be called a Japanese decade. But these period of moderation which the 6% combined conversion of Chinese to US is set in such a way as to project the strength of the Chinese Economy and its future role in the world, is a future whose learning curve is primarily due to U.S Debt to China and also the faith about the future – which in the case holds no pretenses on the conception of U.S as the Major economy power in the world. The rate of credit determines the future market and positive economy, that the inflation is the root course of some of the problems associated with lending – given perhaps the issue of the rate of return when fixed income no longer guarantee adequate payment of dues. How a Bank reacts to such concern creates the bias for lending therefore Bank’s activity is economic circumstance outside the vintage of national growth. That risk is term policy minus GDP.... A crass of the argument between the risky assets and junks bonds in largely pedestrian in entitlement and international tier 3 dominated economies and the ETF for lousy lending one to two crop economy, constraint by population characteristic or social economies but technological buoyant in many respect will not fail to proclaim that international interest in third world markets explains the investors’ interest - especially in junk bonds. We shy with argument that Junk Bond expectations are characteristics of a third world markets or an international banter for trades luring investors from U.S for all exposure and guarantee of profit in stable urns, may not necessarily serve the appetite of every day trader saving the institutional traders that dive the market in any direction with large and portentous buying. There are differences between International specie banks and Universal Banks. This important periodic disclosure between Banks and lenders of last resort, between Banks is the better definition of a stress test and forms the reasons for economic corporation between nations, banks and financial institutions and international standards meeting for stocks and bonds.

Their aspects of financial engineering and problems are the alternative that defines financial engineering and mechanism. One of the most enduring cases of inflation or inflationary pressure is the question of adjustment to the international market. There are natural barriers to certain markets in the worlds - some of it is human barriers created from failures to accept certain changes. The other is the repetitive discourse of advantage and competitive disadvantage. Some of the failures in certain world markets is the ability to apprehend the source of much betrayal - some of its share lack of option and others are questions once ability to grasp the irrelevance. A critical case of world markets is rated through the ability of any financial institution to handle the problems of cyclical market condition endured through the base factors such as development banks or through the growth range of gifted currency. We can state for instance that at the turn of the last century both the English pounds and French Franc decided the affairs of modern society away from Turkey. By the end of WWI and eventually WWII, these currencies had taken a nose dive from the gold standards to upon the U.S dollars as the market order. The provincialism of the argument concerning world market order is that one institution replaces the order and in recent acceptance of Chinese currency as pro-tem a major currency of the world is not so far a bargaining chip that a possible future await for China than the flaw reasoning that production drives price and price and culture of advantage create its own market. The argument is flawed for many reasons, one of which is the failures of certain command economies and political constructions to miss the gaps between productions and manufacturing where manufacturing is the root of healthy credit rating. One of such economies in the world is Japan and the other - Russia, each trapped by frontiers for production and the complex for global markets that failed to inundate history. A theory of Development Banks and the culture of national banks succumb to this examination by fact and in theory; banks play nominal and provincial roles in regulating national currency which in turn offer stability to communities around the world. Banks also play a pivotal hand in helping to initiate the gap between rich and the poor, for sure; the lending factor of any manufacturing community or nationality is a deniability of infinite majesty. We can argue perennially against the failures of certain societies to act upon some policies that the return to the lender is the hung for the prosperity. We can argue that even the requirement for nominal central banks such as the Federal Reserve of the United States and Bank of England for placing baits for new revenue lines, makes the better argument that Community Re-investment Act created as needing requirement creates as much problems are they solve. That the loftily of several international banks heavily engaged in all classes of respect collapse into their right to choose - driven without remorse by credit. In times like this when there are the themes of Red lining original from say housing and American economic requirement for housing in the 1950's is nothing compared to economic activity in very recent times. At some point in New York and several parts of United States, the question of housing and proper planning created such as gap that a fifth of the population literally had problems finding new houses and homes in spite of the heavy investment from international markets. We are confronted by selective choice which enjoins international interest and external economies of scale. The experiment of new market and economic corporation falls short of charity given the nature of renting and return to investment and competitive advantage of international market. We look at it as a fiat with lesser accompli that a Community in say Brazil is refracted through the index of the larger economic umbrellas, the larger hosting choice and privileged access to world markets perpetuating a pursuit of wealth. The Role of the Community is helping to grab some of these opportunities is to force the hands of the investors who are doing business to add to their expectations through a deal. In essence, there are failures associated with say Community Re-investment Act and housing vehicles such as GSE, that it seems to some degree to be a 'social contract'. A financial contract is closer to the general expectations in markets, where a gap widens between the international institutions and communities of interest. It is common that the use of word Banking for African American in the United States merits an expectation in the heavily traded every U.S market, that African American markets no less communities of interest and natives in shared nationality such as Brazil will not shift their ground in financial statement even when there are cases of direct policies of interest such as direct or compulsory employment without the premier roles of Banks and financial cabals. It merits the arguments that the nature of profit is that poor censorship endorses poor control, to a certiorari that failure of international committee of any interest to manage the interest of social navigators and financial benefactors in all respect of business transaction is poor distribution of wealth. No group of international committee of experts caught between the investment and commercial banks with varying degrees of effectual discipline and concerns for exposures, risk, and return of wealth even for the most adroit of all leisure class will fail to recognize the need for moratorium fetching for community development....

Timothy Geither 'Stress Test'

Title - Stress Test

Author - Timothy Geithner - All Reserved.

Year - 2014

Publisher - Crown Publishing

Review - by

Iroabuchi S. Onwuka




To whom it concerns,

The book by Timothy F. Geither - Stress Test - is a New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times - best seller list. Not that the book deserves the average 3.8 stars for a Geithner 'reflections on financial crises' for 2008. There are obvious departures in the books, with emphasis on the decision he had to make as the Chairman of New York Federal Reserve (2003 - 2009) and consequently the Secretary for U.S Treasury (2009 - 2013). A stress test for banks is not a new item but in 2008 crises it was introduced by Bernanke, Paulson and Geithner. The aim was to determine the banks readiness in handling crises or shocks to the system especially based on the experiences with Lehman Brothers and other Investment banks. The exercise with financial instrument ended the careers of many small banks in the United States including banks considered too fail.

The main compenent of the stress test was a bank's ability to function without the extensive support of the Central Bank or Federal Reserve. New requirements for these banks with down time on OCDs, with extensive exposure to International market including 'cuffing out' (Geithner) for the Federal Reserve.


Some of the reserve requirement was the low to zero interest rate and funds rate at very historic lows. One of the problems of the stress test whcih did not meet Basel II Standards was the very failure of these financial engineers to broadly define the limits of its implication. For a long time, the general public - poor with financial literacy simply did not understand the various methods resolved by Paulson - who was on his way out, Bernanke - who was partly experimenting with zero interest, and Geithner - dubbed the last pope of the 2008 class. The lessons are found elsewhere that Geithner - in this book - failed to some extent to define the stress test and how reflections on 2008 amount to a test. Perhaps we can recall that the interest we deserve can be honed through Geithner's thesis on the need to forestall a second financial crisis. On purely academic bench, an attempt to forestall a second crises is a lasting impression of the most logical step following periods of financial failures.

An account of the financial failures in 2008 of the widely read 'Financial Crisis' concerning the formation of crisis was a good job in bad suits or 'so-so' job in clean suits. The same cannot be said of Geithner's 'Stress test' largely for the fact that some of us have followed his career for sometime. The morose introspection that the book conjures for others may lack any meaning for anyone half familiar with the events of 2008 or with the Geithner's banking carion. It is important to make the argument clear that writing 6 years after an incident personally vouchsafed for suffer in quality and pale in amelioration to other genres written a few later. In a sense, the collective dispatch in Alan Blinder's 'When the Music Stopped' is official gravitas for gaps in 'Stress test'. A stress test involves measures that test the background of many institutions under the canopy of Federal Reserve and why they relate to the need to compare financial markets to U.S local derivative, especially the rise of ETF and problems of OTC which buried many investors.

Geithner's story about the 2008 incident is not new or many people impressed by the detailing of the crisis. We were interested in how the stress test of Banks during this period and after proclaimed a new banking order for U.S, especially the concern for making sure there are no repeats. We are interested in how U.S banks were doing over the same period with respect to other banks around the world, and why it was necessary that certain banks had to go following their official statement. We are concerned with periodic timetable for stress test for banks and the issue of economic drift or shift during periods of surplus and how these surplus renade the low interest rate and duration for banks to make necessary changes. We are concerned with other issues of policies which the events of 2008 did not cover or counter, especially the investment and re-investment acts prescribed in Federal Reserve requirement.

We are interested in the last minute measures of 13 (13) policies and why it remained anathema and virtually unknown until the eve of certain investment banks. We have a shadow on knowledge on the various books which details their testimonies about the period and therefore hoped that one of the chief mouthpiece can amend such of the assumptions. All these are expectations that begins to explain the mindset of an averga reader. These were not treated and were hardly a cornerstone in the book. I, for one, see interesting academic asserting and inteligent work which can only come through a Geithner with huanted experience preceding the events locale of 2008.


In reassuring look at the very title 'Stress test' upon his reflections, the title send you on an errand. In an end, we come out wondering why some of the concerns of Geithner were not taken into measure ab-initio, and why it was in rearview a coat for policy. Yet in all, one of the most enduring memories of Timothy Geithner which we need to torch on is the resolution of world markets, that is, he may or may not noticed that identifying in one his speeches why 'markets collides' proved a reason to restore the confidence of dollar and the faith in General Motors. General Motors and General Steel proved one of Obama's daring and deciding leadership instinct, but it was Geither's speech that called the market in 2009.     


There are lessons for a BRIC nation and there are elements of real estate which the new poerhouses made possible in U.S and perhaps elsewhere. The book for this reason is not exactly an ear-ful, is lack luster from the images of Henry Paulson 'On the Brink', is between a thoroughgoing Alan Blinder, and is a shoulder or perhaps more ahead of Andrew Sorkin's 'Too Big to fail'. Too big too fail proved a fitting title for a diary draft of unusual financial period dogged by forced not related study of money or real estate.





Ben Bernanke and Timothy Geithner.



Short View

(II)

We may not take the credit given the opinions of Timothy Geithner (2014) in discussing the impact of BRIC away from ECB, and how BRIC nation such as Russia drove Brazil economy in 1998 into economic recession. We tie the knots that the inseparable economic connection between Russia, Ukraine, Brazil, and Turkey, and the command of ‘collaterized debt obligations’ and ‘asset-backed commercial paper’ may foster hints of economic stress and conditions of neglect which become apparent in the IMF’s warning. The short terms stress test from combined reasons in the book rest easy on borrowing attitude and practical damage of oversight.

Although A joint committee between Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currencies (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision, may enhance the weight on a stress test, we can add that manufacturing is not the same as production and is not small misplacement of credit and the role of international banks. The initially position of the manufacturer or manufacturer index could indicate its origins by the levels of free trade between separate Nations of interest and perhaps nothing else. It is a focus on this particular point in solution of interest rate and quantity of money – which I for one – can fully maintain are not related, that the quality intrinsic value without or not portentous lack the definite structure for inflation and market resources.

 
I look for a gap between ECB and member states banks in playing my cards on stress test, and I look for an inverse and reverse role play between the central banks and bigger and sensitive ECB in coming to grips with a banks' return rate. Based on some of the assumptions between IMF and fund's rate determined by crude oil, the saturation of banks and the new account deposits are effective litmust test on what is going on with a bank. When we compare half of the actions taken by U.S on any given influence in the last few years leading to 2008 or thereafter, it becomes certain that the circumstances surrounding the gap/s of information between the Federal Reserve or other interested group and any banks for deposit in U.S, explains why the actions by Bernanke and Paulson, epecially Bernanke and Geithner proved reactionary and forced in spite of its sucess in 2008. Some of the means od determining the death trap of these banks rest easy on the return rate of businesses, on the performance of small banks and diffusion rate of major Central Banks to national GDP - where fund’s rate with or without a decoupling with crude oil or other major products is proved not the case. 

But the VAR is easily discounted given Real Housing similar to cushion as Precious metals, but the differences especially for instance a VAR misaligned categories of convertible arbitrage and the Banks that create money through loans and mortgage, you may need the GSE; Fannie Mae, Sallie, and MBS to show relative proof that the banks sending under some degree of operational management make argument about importance of Bank policies which exist for instance when there is recall a recall of exposure, generated through a TARF basic coverage which depended on long term lending rates between two parties and generally obfuscate term facilities in lending which a hamster to Banks and their overnight lending. 

At least from the point of concession of foreign dominator to US Banks and/or ETF basics to US investment from both private and institutional money houses heading elsewhere (Third Tier markets in International or Third World economies, or government covered external Bonds whose major returns are through the exchange prairie and the guarantee of currency depression in spite of the in-money cover) or returning from foreign lateral (currency rotation).


It makes it impossible to discriminate between the operational lending of Investment side of the Banks and the Commercial side of the same Banks which some believe guarantees some levels of profit delivered through the composite available to deep resources of the Banks and index which transits to gains and further estimate of debt to earn and hence a bottom-line, either through the arbitrage or through existing or pre-existing banks stocks, whereas debt recovery becomes a restive case for Federal Cartels like the Reserve to force an adjustment to stability through M1 and M2, particular M2 liquid stated money injections.

Apparently, an argument – which I for one – cannot wholly take credit is about arriving at a point on a given momentum where the financial actions of ECB and collateral behavior in separating the fund rates to central banks of member states without combined expectation of lending to individual banks, at a lower rate than the ECB. It will be a form of role reversal, to a point that a role reversal, creates reasonably expectations gap behaviorally separating the performances of a World Bank or IMF and that of Federal or in this ECB, from the actions of the Central Banks like we have in specific economic societies.

 

Quantity is an influence on why products have value and why some don’t, but at no point does it prove a recipe or formula for inflation saving for the attitude of the market place and the expectations of the traders. If a Federal Reserve such as Australia and Central Bank such as England, could master the limits of expectations between major banks in a system dynamic – big banks etcetera - and the role of a central and larger font of last lenders, perhaps – at least in my view – we may come to grasp with versions of Bernanke’s motivation for Big Banks.

For Emily

John A. Garraty (1986)

Title - The Great Depression

Year - 1986

Author - John A. Garraty (1986) ‘

Review 

By

Sampson I.M Onwuka

John A. Garraty (1986) ‘

John A. Garraty (1986) ‘The Great Depression’ and rise of America was not because of Austerity measures the rise of America and their surpassing of Britain, was due to Britain’s relapse into degrees of Austerity measures book Market and Men (1936), by J. W. F Rowe “Sudden and widespread substitution of conscious artificial control for the unconscious control of a laissez-faire system”, which Garraty defended and ameliorated his position in his book to a different light, but the central issue is the great debate about Laissez faire vs. Deliberate Government spending, as similar to the….a commentator in International Labor Review market, that ‘The Fundamental issue is not, as is sometimes still supposed, between economic planning and laissez-faire.  

That question was decided in the years following the collapse of 1929. For good or ill, Government is already exercising and must continue to exercise an active influence in economic affairs.” When we look at themes from this era such as the teachings of President Herbert Hoover who mentioned in his political campaign that ‘THE DEPRESSION WAS NOT STARTED IN THE UNITED STATES’ that it came from Europe he brought to end the speculations for America for Americans, that “The Hurricane that swept our shore was of European origin”, that it was caused by the 1914 – 1918 impact of the WW I and the failure of Europe to make changes in the society.

But as A. Garraty mentioned, President Hoover couldn’t use the above line anymore as the condition got worse in USA. The temptation of seeing economic cycle as ‘essentially self-generating’ pervaded the economic reasoning at this point, the ‘leisure class’ of Veblen Thorsten reasoned along the decision complex of economic cycles, where it was gradually common that ‘good times in economy often portends bad times’ , that hard times usually create depression and depression has the grains of recovery.

This is the basic reason and sometimes undying principle of all economics that we should be able to store the dividend of good years in such a way that will shore for later years. Others mentioned that it is strategic investment at the ‘up’ years when there is booming and profit that gives the country a chance at survival when the boom is over.

This thinking was common in Europe especially among the Austrian School of economics until the coming the Great Depression and the introduction of momentum based economics which required a levitating of demand or aggregate-demand theory of John Keynes who argued against the normal cyclical market.

One of the Primus Inter alia of all US economic environment and market is Irving Fischer who looks to the possibility of stimulating growth through demand as a way to grow the economy, was essentially a case that Keynes made for anti-cyclical economy that lampooned laissez economic theory.

An economic growth can be made possible through effective planning which involves meeting and exceeding the economic balance sheet of most economies in the World that some years which are said to be better than others are theories that effectively strangulated some of the basic actions that could have saved the depression, in many ways than one, it was a matter of how well any society could effectively generate new investment and growth from what was essentially a problem of structure.

In U.S, people began to believe that the progress made by stock market in 20’s was a period of great leaps, that there were no changes at this period done to the structures in U.S, that American structure in these age leading to jump in the great economy was from an age America was not an empire, that when America got the attention that it wanted as blossomed into a super state, it was cultural backwards.